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UNANIMOUS CONSENSUS AGAINST AGM?
RUSH T. STEWART
Abstract. Given the role consensus is supposed to play in the social aspects of inquiry and
deliberation, it is important that we may always identify a consensus as the basis of joint inquiry
and deliberation. However, it turns out that if we think of an agent revising her beliefs to reach a
consensus, then, on the received view of belief revision, AGM belief revision theory, certain simple
and compelling consensus positions are not always available.
Keywords. AGM; belief revision; consensus; disagreement; unanimity
1. Introduction
Concern for epistemic consensus is a hallmark of pragmatist epistemology. In “The Fixation
of Belief,” Peirce criticizes certain methods of belief formation on the grounds that their failure
to secure wide-spread consensus will undermine the resulting beliefs (Peirce, 1992a, pp. 116-117).
In other places, Peirce can be interpreted as proposing a definition of truth in terms of consensus
in the long run of inquiry, or as asserting that, if inquiry were to go on indefinitely, the truth
would be consensually settled upon in the limit (e.g., Peirce, 1992b, pp. 138-139; Misak, 2004,
pp. 67-70). Later, and notoriously, Rorty advocated consensus-type accounts of knowledge and
truth. As Guignon and Hartely summarize his view, “There is no basis for deciding what counts
as knowledge and truth other than what one’s peers will let one get away with in open exchange
of claims, counterclaims, and reasons” (2003, p. 11). Consensus also figures prominently in Isaac
Levi’s brand of pragmatism. Levi denies that “inquiry can proceed without appeal to some point of
view (state of full belief, demands for information, judgments of credal probability, etc.),” while also
denying that “there is some standard, objective point of view to which appeal may always be made”
(1991, p. 87). However, these denials are not tantamount to “cognitive licentiousness” or “epistemic
anarchy,” according to Levi, because we can always identify a consensus as shared agreement that
can function as a non-question-begging initial position for joint inquiry (1991, pp. 87-88). On
Levi’s proposal, parties to a consensus should restrict themselves to the shared agreements between
their points of view. Once on common ground, the group can engage in hypothetical reasoning and
inquiry.
Unanimity or shared agreement is one simple and perhaps obvious account of consensus. On
this view, epistemic consensus among some belief sets consists of the beliefs held in common,
those beliefs that are unanimously held (Levi, 1996, Chp. 2). In a sense, shared agreement is the
analogue of the conciliatory position in the literature on peer disagreement for sets of beliefs (e.g.,
Christensen, 2009; Feldman, 2011). A shift to consensus as shared agreement suspends judgment
on beliefs about which there is not agreement. It turns out, though, that on the received view of
how an agent ought to revise her beliefs, AGM belief revision theory, unanimous consensus is not
always available to serve as the basis of joint inquiry or deliberation. The key move here is to think
of reaching a consensus (for an agent) as an agent revising her beliefs to a belief set that represents
a consensus position for some set of rival belief sets. In light of the results presented below, we
are confronted with a classic modus ponens/modus tollens dilemma. On the one hand, if an agent
should always be able to contract her belief set to unanimous consensus with another belief set,
then the propositions that follow are damning for AGM partial meet contraction. On the other
hand, if the AGM account or another account for which analogous results hold is found sufficiently
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compelling, so much the worse for the availability of unanimity for the purposes of collective inquiry
and deliberation. This note establishes the existence of such a dilemma.
2. AGM Contraction
The unanimous consensus or consensus as shared agreement for two sets of beliefs, K1 and K2,
is given by the beliefs common to both sets, that is, by the intersection: K1 XK2. So, a transition
from either K1 or K2 to K1XK2 must be a contraction, an operation of belief removal. How ought
an agent to go about contracting her beliefs? The AGM paradigm offers perhaps the most familiar
and well-explored proposal. Let’s briefly review it.
Let L be a propositional language that is closed under truth functional operations. We let lower
case Greek letters, α, β, ... (except γ), range over sentences, and capital Roman letters, A,B, ...,
refer to sets of sentences. By closure, if α P L, then  α P L. If α, β P L, then α _ β is in L, and
so on. We use lower case Roman letters, p, q, ..., to denote the atomic formulae of the language.
Let Cn be a Tarskian consequence operator: Cn : PpLq Ñ PpLq. A sentence α is in CnpAq if
and only if α is a logical consequence of A.1 We call K a theory if K is deductively closed, i.e.,
K “ CnpKq. Let K denote the set of all deductively closed subsets of L. Belief sets are elements
of K, with sentences representing beliefs.
There are three standard belief change operations. In expansion, a sentence is added to K. But
expansion can introduce inconsistency. Revision incorporates a sentence into K while preserving
consistency. Contraction removes beliefs from K. We put K ´ α for the result of contracting α
from K with ´ : K ˆ L Ñ K. There are choices to be made in contraction since, in general, how
to alter K so that a sentence is no longer a consequence is not uniquely determined. For example,
if α, αÑ β, β P K, then at least one of the other sentences, α or αÑ β, must also be surrendered
if β is to be contracted. The AGM postulates for contraction are as follows.
(´1) K ´ α “ CnpK ´ αq whenever K “ CnpKq
p´2q K ´ α Ď K
(´3) If α R K, then K Ď K ´ α
p´4) If α P K ´ α, then α P CnpHq
p´5q K Ď CnppK ´ αq Y tαuq
p´6q If Cnpαq “ Cnpβq, then K ´ α “ K ´ β
p´7q K ´ αXK ´ β Ď K ´ pα^ βq
(´8) If α R K ´ pα^ βq, then K ´ pα^ βq Ď K ´ α
The first six postulates are known as the basic postulates; the last two, as the supplementary
postulates.
Various concrete contraction constructions have been explored in the literature. In partial meet
contraction, the central focus is on so-called remainder sets, the set of all maximal subsets of K
that do not imply α, the α-remainders of K. The typical stated motivation for such focus is
informational economy. Because information is valuable, agents should seek to retain as much of
it as possible when contracting their belief sets.2
1As is customary, we assume Cn satisfy certain standard properties:
(Inclusion) A Ď CnpAq
(Monotonicity) If A Ď B, then CnpAq Ď CnpBq
(Iteration) CnpAq “ CnpCnpAqq
(Supraclassicality) If α is a classical consequence of A, then α P CnpAq
(Deduction) β P CnpAY tαuq iff αÑ β P CnpAq
(Compactness) If α P CnpAq, then α P CnpA1q for some finite A1 Ď A
2Levi has stressed in numerous places that the loss of informational value—and not of informational content—is
what should be minimized in contraction (1991; 2004). The point here is that it is possible for K 1 to bear as much
informational value as K even if K 1 Ă K. Consequently, restricting our attention to remainder sets is misguided. Hans
Rott argues that, in any case, informational economy does not play the role in AGM belief revision that it is generally
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Definition 1. The set of α-remainders of K is given by
KKα “ tK 1 Ď K : piq α R CnpK 1q, piiq if β P K but β R K 1, then β Ñ α P K 1u
A partial meet contraction takes the intersection of some selection of elements in KKα. The
selection function γ : PpKq Ñ PpKq chooses a nonempty subset γpKKαq of KKα (when KKα “
H, γpKKαq “ K). We call ´ a partial meet contraction operator just in case there exists a selection
function such that the following holds:
K ´ α “
č
γpKKαq
The six basic contraction postulates characterize partial meet contraction.
Theorem 1. (e.g., Gärdenfors, 1988) A contraction function, ´, is a partial meet contraction
function iff ´ satisfies p´1q ´ p´6q.
The supplementary postulates constrain the partial meet contractions further (by constraining the
behavior of γ).
3. Contracting to Consensus
When two agents with consistent belief sets, K1 and K2, disagree on some δ in the sense that
δ P K1 and  δ P K2, it is clear that each can suspend judgment on δ by contracting by δ and  δ,
respectively (Elkin, 2015). However, articulating an account of how to transition to a particular
desired corpus has not been the AGM agenda. Instead, the aim is to provide an account of how to
accommodate some given input (in contraction, the “input” sentence is to be removed). But the
motivation or justification for the input sentence is not part of the formal account of belief revision
in the AGM paradigm. It is reasonable to think that one possible motivation for contracting a
particular sentence may be to achieve consensus with another corpus. That is, the desire to shift
to a specific sub-corpus may underwrite contracting a particular sentence. Is focusing on a single
sentence in general sufficient to reach consensus as shared agreement? Put another way, is the
belief set that represents unanimous consensus with another belief set always accessible in the
AGM framework?
No. We can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1. It is not the case that, for any consistent belief sets K1,K2 P K and any partial
meet contraction operator ´, there is a sentence α such that K1 ´ α “ K1 XK2.
(Proofs of propositions are relegated to the appendix.) The upshot of Proposition 1 is that there are
partial meet contraction operators for which consensus with certain other belief sets is not available.
We might wonder, however, about epistemically opportunistic agents. Perhaps an agent would be
willing to employ a different partial meet contraction operator just to reach consensus. But much
of the work in belief revision presupposes that an agent is committed to a unique contraction
operator at a given time (e.g., Hansson, 2003, p. 44). Given well-known results in the literature,
this is tantamount to an agent’s being committed (at a given time) to a single way of assessing
what the “best” elements of KKα are in the case of partial meet contraction, or a single way of
assessing the epistemic usefulness or value of sentences in L in the case of epistemic entrenchment,
or a single way of assessing, essentially, the plausibility of possible worlds in the case of a Grove
system of spheres.
Furthermore, in the infinite case, there are other straightforward limitations, as the next propo-
sition attests. Proposition 2 demonstrates that the strategy of either putting further restrictions
on the class of partial meet contractions—so that only full meet or some other subset of the partial
meet contractions are allowed—or permitting agents to employ alternative partial meet contraction
ascribed (2000). Consider, for example, the fact that partial meet contraction and not maxichoice contraction plays
the central role.
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operators for the purpose of contracting to consensus is not a general workaround for the limitation
indicated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Let L contain infinitely many atomic sentences. It is not the case that for every
pair of consistent belief sets K1,K2 P K there is some partial meet contraction, ´, such that
K1 ´ α “ K1 XK2 for some sentence α.
So there are belief sets for which no partial meet contraction operator yields consensus for some
sentential input. Proposition 2 represents more than a mere remote mathematical obstacle for AGM
contraction according to a pragmatist of Levi’s stripe. Pragmatists have long resisted accounts of
privileged or fixed languages and conceptual schemes. We should be open to refining our language
as appropriate.
We might consider equipping each belief set with a special-purpose consensus contraction op-
erator, ´CK2 , such that K1 ´CK2 α “ K1 X K2 for any α P L. In a similar vein, Levi considers
consensus-based revisions which result from first contracting to shared agreements (e.g., K1´CK2α),
then adding a sentence (Levi, 1996, p. 42). Consensus-based revisions can be used to engage in
group hypothetical reasoning from a shared background corpus, for example. As the next observa-
tion shows, ´CK2 is at odds with the AGM vision of belief contraction (I omit the proof).
Proposition 3. Let K1,K2 P K and define ´CK2 by setting K1 ´CK2 α “ K1 XK2 for all α P L.
´CK2
satisfies p´1q, p´2q, p´6q, p´7q, and p´8q; however, p´3q, p´4q, and p´5q are not satisfied.
4. Discussion
If rational contraction were restricted to AGM partial meet contraction, unanimity or consensus
as shared agreement would not always be available to serve as a non-question-begging position at
the outset of inquiry. An agent may have no rational recourse but to beg questions against certain
other parties or points of view. Whether this is (further) evidence against AGM or against the
importance of unanimous consensus requires further argumentation. But there are a few concerns
that should still be addressed, even if briefly. These concerns represent ways to minimize the
interest of the above results.
First, one might complain about the overly conservative nature of unanimity. For approaches
that attempt to assimilate reaching an epistemic consensus to voting, for instance, the presence of
a single dissenter would seem insufficient grounds for excluding an otherwise unanimously accepted
proposition from the consensus corpus. If complete unanimity is required for consensus, consensus
is exceedingly rare, one might object. At any rate, many social and political decisions get made
without it. Though I have not undertaken a defense of unanimity here, in order for the central
tension of the present note to be of real interest, the unanimity conception of consensus should not
be a non-starter. Whether unanimity is a nonstarter depends on the relevant function consensus is
supposed to play. If that function is to avoid begging questions or to serve as a non-controversial
basis for joint inquiry and deliberation—as at least it sometimes is—it is voting accounts, not
unanimity, that may fail to get off the line.
Second, we might explore a more general notion of “accessibility” within the AGM paradigm.
For example, we could ask about which belief states are accessible under some finite sequence of
contractions instead of by just a single contraction. We cannot gloss over the notorious problem
of iterated revision here (e.g., Spohn, 1988; Boutilier, 1993; Gärdenfors and Rott, 1995; Darwiche
and Pearl, 1997; Hansson, 2003; Nayak et al., 2003). Briefly put, the problem is that AGM belief
revision theory and a number of variant belief revision theories constrain only a single stage of belief
revision. There is no account of iterated belief change in the classic AGM framework or in many of
its relatives. And while various attempts to remedy this have been made (e.g., Darwiche and Pearl,
1997; Spohn, 2012), these attempts are not without substantial controversy. A compelling solution
to the problem, Hansson observes, “has turned out to be very difficult to achieve” (2003, p. 42).
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For a recent overview and critical assessment of attempts to solve the problem, see (Booth and
Chandler, 2016). And then there are others, like Levi, who deny that there is a serious problem of
iterated belief change because they deny that there are diachronic norms of rationality (e.g., Levi,
1980, pp. 9 - 13). On such views, we cannot make general claims about rational, iterated belief
change. So, an account of reaching consensus via iterated contraction awaits a compelling account
of iterated contraction which so far has proved difficult to articulate and which some think is not
in the offing.
More optimistically, we might think of single-shot accessibility as providing a criterion that
determines with which belief states it is rational for an agent to seek consensus. While contracting
to the unanimous consensus with another belief state is not possible in general, with respect to some
belief states it is. In other ways, this is a pessimistic view, as it surrenders the general possibility
of non-question-begging joint inquiry and deliberation.
Third, we might distinguish standards for genuinely contracting beliefs from those for hypothet-
ically doing so (e.g., Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994; Levi, 1996). In supposing α for the sake of the
argument, an agent need not actually come to believe α. Similarly, in hypothetically contracting α,
an agent need not genuinely surrender the belief. Keeping a firm grasp on the distinction between
actual beliefs and hypothetical suppositions or contractions is as important in decision making as
it is in epistemology. In decision making, hypothetical reasoning is used to plan for contingencies
and to consider the effects of potential choices. If standards of rational contraction are uniform
across actual and hypothetical revision, the observations above point to a tension for AGM and the
general possibility of shifting to consensus, whether we understand seeking consensus as a matter
of genuinely or hypothetically revising beliefs. If different standards of contraction are appropri-
ate depending on whether the belief change is genuine or hypothetical, AGM and the universal
availability of unanimity can’t both be constraints on a given domain. Given that AGM provides
no account of how the input sentence came to be the input sentence (that is, no full account of
justified expansion or contraction), we might be tempted to think of AGM as a candidate account
of hypothetical belief revision. In hypothetical belief revision, it may be reasonably maintained
that there is no need to justify the input (Levi, 1996, pp. 6-7). Similarly, we might not be prepared
to endorse a genuine shift to shared agreements. But hypothetical shifts to unanimous agreement
“for the sake of the argument” are more compelling.3 However, both the AGM axioms and the
universal availability of unanimity cannot be constraints on hypothetical revision.
Fourth, while AGM is indeed a very prominent account of belief revision, there are well-explored
alternatives. After all, Levi, who advocates consensus as shared agreement, rejects AGM partial
meet contraction in favor of a more general account that he calls mild contraction (Levi, 2004) alias
severe withdrawal (Rott and Pagnucco, 1999). It is worth pointing out that an analogous result
holds for mild contraction. Unanimous consensus is not always available even with mild contraction
(Stewart and Levi, MS). My concern here, though, is with the tension between the AGM account
of contraction and universal availability of consensus, not the details of Levi’s views. However,
there are accommodating generalizations of the AGM framework. It is shown in the appendix that
package contraction, for example, allows us to state a straightforward and universally sufficient
condition for shifting to shared agreements (Proposition 4). Fuhrmann and Hansson ask, “can it
3We need make no claim about whether K1 represents the totality of beliefs or just those beliefs relevant to
addressing a particular question. For example, K1 might be the deductive closure of a particular collection of beliefs
regarding some physical domain—a theory—aspects of which are under dispute between K1 and K2. In that case,
urging consensus as shared agreement on the relevant issues would appear to be less immediately objectionable
than urging such a conservative consensus position on the totality of beliefs. Agent 1 may only be concerned about
consensus on the physical theory because agent 2 is an “epistemic peer” in that domain, for exmaple, and rest content
with lingering disagreement on other topics. If an agent’s whole view about the world is the relevant issue, the account
of consensus is general and covers that case, too.
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ever be rational to engage in [package] contraction?” Seeking consensus may provide a compelling
rationale.
Technical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (cf. Hansson, 1999, p. 135) Let L be based on two atomic sentences, p and q. L contains
sixteen non-equivalent sentences. Let K1 “ Cnptp ^ quq. Then, we can list the logically distinct
elements of K1: tp ^ q, p, p Ø q, q, p Ñ q, p _ q, q Ñ p,Ju. Let K2 “ Cnptp _ quq. Then,
K1 XK2 “ K2. Consider the remainder sets of K1.
K1Kp^ q “ tCnptpuq, Cnptquq, CnptpØ ququ
K1Kp “ tCnptquq, CnptpØ ququ
K1KpØ q “ tCnptpuq, Cnptququ
K1Kq “ tCnptpuq, CnptpØ ququ
K1KpÑ q “ tCnptpuqu
K1Kp_ q “ tCnptpØ ququ
K1Kq Ñ p “ tCnptququ
K1KJ “ H
Now let γ be such that
γpK1Kp^ qq “ tCnptpØ ququ
γpK1Kpq “ tCnptquq, CnptpØ ququ
γpK1KpØ qq “ tCnptququ
γpK1Kqq “ tCnptpØ ququ
γpK1KpÑ qq “ tCnptpuqu
γpK1Kp_ qq “ tCnptpØ ququ
γpK1Kq Ñ pq “ tCnptququ
γpK1KJq “ tCnptp^ ququ
With the exception of K1 ´ p, the partial meet contractions are given by the sole members of
the selection sets. K1 ´ q “
Ş
γpK1Kqq, for instance, is Cnptp Ø quq. For K1 ´ p, we have
Ş
tCnptquq, Cnptp Ø ququ “ Cnptp Ñ quq. So, not only do we have K1 ´ p _ q ‰ K1 XK2, but
K1 ´α ‰ K1XK2 for any α. In this example, ´ is not a maxichoice contraction. Another example
sufficient to illustrate the proposition could be constructed by selecting a single element of K1Kp,
say pØ q, converting ´ into a maxichoice contraction (which would also be a transitively relational
partial meet contraction), but the present example illustrates that the limitations for shifting to
consensus apply to partial meet contractions more generally. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let K1 be a maximal consistent subset of L, i.e., for any α P L, either α P K1 or  α P K1
(but not both). Let K2 “ CnpHq. We show that the full meet contraction of K1 by any sentence




K1Kα—is not identical to CnpHq. Specifically, we
show that any full meet is a superset of CnpHq. And since any sentence in the full meet is also in
any partial meet, it follows that no partial meet contraction of K1 is identical to CnpHq “ K1XK2.
If ´ is a full meet contraction function and α P K1, then K1 ´ α “ K1 X Cnpt αuq (e.g.,
Gärdenfors, 1988, Lemma 4.9; Hansson, 1999, Observation 2.12). α contains instances of only
finitely many atomic sentences, where tpi : i P Iu is the set of atomic sentences of L. Let pi be an
atomic sentence in K1 that does not occur in α. Clearly,  α_ pi P K1XCnpt αuq. If α P CnpHq,
then K1 X Cnpt αuq “ K1 ‰ CnpHq. So, let α be contingent. Since pi is atomic, pi R CnpHq.
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But since all of the atomic sentences are independent and pi does not occur in α,  α_ pi R CnpHq
either (consider the truth table). So K1 XK2 “ CnpHq Ă K1 ´ α for any sentence α. 
Unanimous Consensus for Package Contraction
Motivated by the limitations of “singleton” contraction, Fuhrmann and Hansson study multiple
contractions, operations simultaneously contracting a set of sentences (1994). They identify two
primary types of multiple contractions. Package contractions remove all of a set of sentences from
the belief set; choice contractions remove at least one among a set of sentences. As they argue,
multiple contraction should not be thought of in terms of sequential contraction. In sequential
contractions, the order of contractions makes a difference to the resulting belief state. So a privileged
sequence would have to be identified. Such a sequence finds no analogue in multiple contraction.
This is to say nothing of the infamous problems confronting AGM regarding iterated revisions.
The setup for partial meet package contraction mirrors that of AGM partial meet contraction.
We make use of a multiple conclusion relation, $, familiar from sequent calculus. For sets of
sentences, A,B, we put A $ B when B XCnpAq ‰ H. The postulates below make use of a notion
of equivalence-according-to-K. A ”K B holds iff @C Ď K : C $ Aô C $ B.
Fuhrmann and Hansson’s postulates are as follows.
p´1q K ´ rAs Ď K
p´2q If H & A, then AX pK ´ rAsq “ H
p´3q If A ”K B, then K ´ rAs “ K ´ rBs
p´4q If α P KzK ´ rAs, then there is some K 1 such that K ´ rAs Ď K 1 Ď K and K 1 & A and
K 1, α $ A
Definition 2. The set of all package A-remainders of K is given by
KKA “ tK 1 Ď K : piqK 1 & A, piiq@K2 : K 1 Ă K2 Ď K ñ K2 $ Au
A package partial meet contraction takes the intersection of some selection of elements in KKA
K ´ rAs “
č
γpKKAq
Fuhrmann and Hansson’s postulates characterize package partial meet contraction.
Theorem 2. (Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994, Thm. 9) An operation ´ is a K partial meet con-
traction iff ´ satisfies p´1q ´ p´4q for all K P K and all sets A,B P PpLq.
Proposition 4. Let ´ be a package partial meet contraction operator. If A “ K1zK2, then K1 ´
rAs “ K1 XK2.
Proof. The proof proceeds by showing that K1 XK2 is the only A-remainder of K1, i.e., K1KA “
tK1 XK2u. First, then, we show that K1 XK2 P K1KA. It is clear that both pK1 XK2q Ď K1 and
that K1XK2 & A. We need only show that for any K
1 P K, if pK1XK2q Ă K 1 Ď K1, then K 1 $ A.
Suppose the antecedent holds. Then, there is some α P K 1 such that α R K1 XK2. It follows that
α P K1zK2 “ A. Hence, K
1 $ A. So, K1 XK2 P K1KA.
Assume for reductio that there is a K 1 P K1KA such that K
1 ‰ K1XK2. So either there is some
α P K 1zpK1 XK2q, or else there is some α P pK1 XK2qzK
1. Suppose the former. Since K 1 Ď K1, α
must be in A. So, K 1 $ A, contrary to our assumption that K 1 is an A-remainder of K1. Suppose
the latter. Then, the only possibility is that K 1 Ă pK1 XK2q Ď K1 (since K
1 Ć pK1 XK2q entails
that there is an β P K 1zpK1 X K2q, and, again, β P K
1zpK1 X K2q entails K
1 $ A). But clearly,
K1 XK2 & A, again, contrary to our assumption that K
1 is an A-remainder of K1. 
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